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SIPDIS

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STATE PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/OTI
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, SFO
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PREL](#) [EAID](#) [PREF](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [SOCI](#) [SU](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [AU](#)
SUBJECT: SUDAN: Update on U.S. Government Support for
Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation

REF: KHARTOUM 1282

Summary and Comment

¶1. (SBU) As described in previous cable traffic, U.S. Government priorities for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation are three-fold: (1) quickly disseminate information about the content of the DPA to counter confusion and anger among Sudanese due to misinformation or lack of information; (2) support the DPA implementation process to the greatest extent possible through the African Union (AU), in order to shore up the African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) credibility; and (3) immediately increase the capacity of the SLM-Minawi (SLM-M) faction to fulfill its obligations under the DPA.

¶2. (SBU) Immediate efforts by AMIS, UNMIS, and government donors to ensure widespread dissemination of information about the DPA are underway. Support for DPA implementation through AMIS proceeds, albeit slowly.

¶3. (SBU) Preliminary results of a USAID-funded assessment of opportunities for peace-building and reconciliation reveal that continued lack of security and distrust on the part of displaced populations regarding Government intentions necessitate an extremely careful approach to community-level engagement in the near term. End summary and comment.

Immediate Outreach Efforts Underway

¶4. (U) Post is pursuing multiple avenues for increasing access to information about the DPA among key stakeholders in Darfur and Khartoum. Post has provided the AU factsheet to USAID-funded Sudan Radio Service (SRS) for broadcast on shortwave radio into Darfur. Through funding from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI), academic experts have translated the AU factsheet on the DPA into simple Arabic and will shortly translate it into the major tribal languages spoken in Darfur (Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Dajo, Tama, Midoob, Berti) for broadcast on SRS and state radio stations as possible, and distribution on cassette. USAID Director will meet with the head of Government-controlled

TV and radio outlets to discuss freeing up air time for "neutral" programming on the DPA.

¶5. (U) Additionally, State/PRM and USAID-funded partner Internews is broadcasting material about the DPA provided by Embassy N'Djamena on Radio Absoun, which reaches Darfurian refugees in IDP camps on the Chadian border.

¶6. (SBU) In addition to radio broadcast, USAID/OTI has identified several Khartoum-based NGOs with offices in Darfur that are willing to conduct community-level DPA outreach efforts. These groups are developing their dissemination strategy, which will include distribution of the DPA full text, AU summary, and UNMIS "DPA Made Easy" brochure. Several NGO representatives are on the ground in Darfur presently discussing outreach efforts with local groups. One organization has already received funding for distribution of 600 copies of the full text in Arabic and English in Khartoum and El Fasher. (Note: Due to the still controversial nature of the DPA, only the most courageous groups are currently willing to conduct dissemination and outreach activities. End note.)

¶7. (U) USAID/OTI is also exploring with interested academics and NGOs a plan to organize discussion seminars in Khartoum and at the three major universities in El Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina.

AU As A Partner Is Amenable But Weak

¶8. (SBU) Embassy and USAID officials have met with AMIS

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in Khartoum and El Fasher to discuss support to the AU and the signatories for DPA implementation. AMIS officials indicate that they are eager for assistance and support, but follow-through from their side is slow.

¶9. (U) As reported in reftel, on several occasions Post has discussed with AMIS officials the establishment of office facilities for DPA signatories and AU DPA Implementation Teams in El Fasher and Khartoum. USAID/OTI will provide an in-kind grant to the AU in El Fasher. USAID/OTI has already identified an appropriate facility and is now securing the lease and beginning renovations. Assistance with Commerce licenses will be needed in order to provide computer and communications equipment.

¶10. (U) Per reftel, Post has also discussed with AMIS officials the establishment of an office in Khartoum. AMIS would like a facility that could house up to 50 people including the DPA implementation team, DDDC preparatory committee staff, signatories, and UK-seconded media/outreach staff. Support for this office will be provided through an existing Department contract with Dyncorp, and implementation awaits the arrival of Dyncorp staff from Washington. AMIS officials identified this as their most urgent need at present and are extremely eager for progress on this facility. Again, assistance with Commerce licenses will be needed in order to provide computer and communications equipment.

¶11. (SBU) The SLM-M and AMIS have also requested that advisors already expert on Darfur and familiar to the SLM-M be deployed as soon as possible to assist with wealth and power-sharing issues; several individuals have already been identified by SLM-M and AMIS and arrangements are currently underway. USAID/OTI is also prepared to second technical support through the AU to SLM-M in the form of Arabic-speaking strategic communications advisors. These individuals are prepared to deploy and Post has provided some CVs to MS.

Communications support will be coordinated with three-person team seconded to AMIS from UK. (Note: SLM-M is also keenly interested in arrival of USG security expert to provide assistance in this area. End note.)

Quick Impact Projects and Humanitarian/Recovery
Programming

¶12. (U) In anticipation of the pending supplemental, which includes \$66.7 million for non-food humanitarian assistance in Darfur, USAID's Darfur Field Office is urging its partners to submit proposals that integrate activities supporting the potential return of internally-displaced persons and that maintain flexibility to respond to DPA-related humanitarian needs as they develop on the ground. USAID is also identifying possibilities for quick-impact projects that will more immediately demonstrate a tangible impact of the DPA, where security will allow.

¶13. (U) USAID is also intensely engaged with preparations for the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The JAM will undertake an assessment of recovery and reconstruction/development needs to present to donors at a pledging conference hosted by the Netherlands in early October. Organization of the Core Coordinating Group (CCG), chaired by the Netherlands and comprised of the parties to the DPA, the UN and World Bank, and key donors, is well underway. USAID will provide funding and technical experts to the JAM, as well as serve on the CCG which will provide overall guidance to the JAM.

Other Donor Support

¶14. (SBU) Other donors are also planning early support for DPA implementation and quick impact projects. UK will provide a three-person communications team to the AU to strengthen capacity to design and implement

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dissemination and outreach strategies. USAID is prepared to provide complementary media support to DPA signatories as well as administrative platform for UK team, through facilities in El Fasher and Khartoum. UK is also preparing to provide English language training for 100 SLM-Minawi. The Netherlands and Norway both have funding for quick impact projects, looking to UNMIS to take lead on identifying and coordinating these activities. Norway is prepared to fund logistics for local-level meetings in support of the DPA, as well as a DPA Signatories/Implementation Team office in Nyala similar to what USG has offered for Khartoum and El Fasher.

¶15. (SBU) Efforts between AMIS and UNMIS to coordinate DPA implementation support are not off to a great start, though meetings between the two have been held. UNMIS has produced a matrix of actions to take place, many of which fall into AMIS' area of responsibility. AMIS is receiving offers of assistance from a variety of bilateral donors, and is expected to provide a consolidated set of priorities for donors to coordinate and organize around.

On the Ground, Peacebuilding Remains Sensitive Topic

¶16. (SBU) USAID fielded a two-person consultant team including Sudan expert Victor Tanner and a local Darfur expert linked to El Fasher University to conduct an assessment of short- and medium-term opportunities for peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in Darfur. The

team is still in the field, having already traveled to Nyala, Abu Ajura, Tulus, Katila, Idd-al-Fursan, and Kass, and is scheduled to travel to Geneina, Mornei, Zallingei, Saraf Omra, Birkat Saira, and Kabkabia.

¶17. (SBU) More complete findings of the assessment will be forthcoming at the end of fieldwork o/a June 15, but preliminary results suggest that the situation on the ground at present requires an extremely sensitive approach to community-level reconciliation efforts. Key informants among displaced communities report that they view the conflict as primarily between communities and the GoS, rather than between tribes, and they view inter-tribal reconciliation as secondary to the need for addressing government violence.

¶17. (SBU) The GoS has supported a number of tribal reconciliation efforts, but these are viewed by many key stakeholders as an attempt by the government to decrease their own responsibility for the conflict, thereby rendering tribal reconciliation efforts suspect in the eyes of many.

¶18. (SBU) The team reports that the topic of the DPA is still very sensitive, and most community representatives do not even want to discuss it, although this will likely change if additional Fur leaders sign. Many Darfurian elites in the major cities have reportedly not yet seen or read the DPA, therefore a phased dissemination strategy beginning in urban centers and proceeding to rural areas and IDP camps may be most appropriate.

Support for SLM Leadership Tenuous

¶19. (SBU) Feedback from the USAID-funded travel to North and South Darfur of a Sudanese NGO director to interview various communities on the DPA suggests that support within the SLM for either Abdul Wahid or Minni Minawi remains extremely tenuous, with different dynamics operating in each case. The Fur and other SLM-AW constituencies are reportedly frustrated with Wahid and may seek outside support to convene a conference to discuss leadership issues.

¶20. (SBU) This organization further reports that support for Minawi within the Zaghawa tribe is increasingly tenuous and more and more localized to his sub-tribe and clan base. Incidents of the past week around Birmaza in

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North Darfur cited to support this. While these reports may reflect one perspective on Minawi's hold on leadership, the ICRC sub-delegation head in El Fasher told a USG delegation on June 1 that SLM-M is "crumbling".

STEINFELD